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Multi-asset minority games
G. Bianconi1, A. De Martino2, F. F. Ferreira3 and M. Marsili1
1The Abdus Salam ICTP, Strada Costiera 14, 34014 Trieste, Italy
2CNR-ISC, INFM-SMC and Dipartimento di Fisica,
Universita` di Roma “La Sapienza”, p.le A. Moro 2, 00185 Roma, Italy and
3 EACH, Universidade De Sa˜o Paulo, Av. Arlindo Be´tio 1000,03828-080 Sa˜o Paulo,Brazil
We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different
assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that
the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information
available in that market. More specifically, in the canonical game players play preferentially in the
stock with less information. The same holds in the grand canonical game when agents have positive
incentives to trade, whereas when agents payoff are solely related to their speculative ability they
display a larger propensity to invest in the information-rich asset. Furthermore, in this model one
finds a globally predictable phase with broken ergodicity.
PACS numbers: :
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of systems of heterogeneous adaptive agents
through Minority Games (MGs) [1, 2] has attracted much
interest from statistical physicists. Despite the simplicity
of the interactions between agents, these models generate
rich static and dynamical structures which can often be
well understood at the mathematical level through the
use of spin-glass techniques [3, 4]. While the MG has
found applications in different types of problems (see for
example [5]), it was originally designed to address the is-
sue of how the microscopic behavior of traders – specula-
tors in particular – may give rise to the anomalous global
fluctuation phenomena observed empirically in financial
markets. In this respect the most successful version of
the MG has perhaps been the grand-canonical MG [6, 7],
in which traders may abstain from investing, so that the
traded volume fluctuates in time.
The core of MGs is the assumption that traders react
to the receipt of an information pattern (be it exogenous
or endogenous) by taking a simple trading decision such
as buying or selling. The key control parameter is the
ratio between the number of traders and the ‘complexity’
of the information space, measured by the number of
possible patterns. In general, when this ratio exceeds
a certain threshold MGs undergo a phase transition to
a macroscopically efficient state where it is not possible
to predict statistically whether a certain decision will be
fruitful or not based on the received information alone.
Real markets are typically formed by different assets
and are characterized by non trivial correlations [8–10].
These correlations arise from the underlying behavior
of the economics (the fundamentals) but they are also
“dressed” by the effect of financial trading. In this pa-
per, we will use the Minority Game in order to investi-
gate how speculative trading affects the different assets
in a market. Versions of MG where agents are engaged
in different contexts have already been introduced and
studied [11, 12]. More precisely, we shall investigate how
speculative trading contributes to financial correlations,
and how speculators distribute their trading volume de-
pending on the information content of the different asset
markets.
Our first result is that speculative trading does not
contribute in a sensible manner to financial correlations,
and if it does, it likely contributes a negative correlation.
The reason is that, within the schematic picture of the
MG, speculators are uniquely driven by profit considera-
tions and totally disregard risk. The same cannot be said
for strategies on lower frequencies (buy and hold) where
risk minimization of the portfolio becomes important.
Our second main conclusion is that, when there are
positive incentives to trade, speculators invest preferen-
tially on the asset with the smallest information content.
This apparently paradoxical conclusion is reverted when
speculators have no incentive to trade, other than making
a profit. This is due to the fact that speculators, when
they are forced to trade also contribute to information
asymmetries.
Finally, with respect to the usual classification in
phases of the MG, we find a considerably richer phase
diagram where different components of the market may
be in different phases. These conclusions are derived for
the case of a market composed of two assets, which allows
for a simpler treatment and provides a more transparent
picture. Their validity can be extended in straightfor-
ward ways to the case of markets with a generic number
of assets.
The paper is articulated in three parts. Section II is
dedicated to the study of a canonical MG where agents
can choose on which of two assets to invest. In Sec-
tion III we discuss the grand-canonical version of this
model, where agents are also allowed to refrain from in-
vesting. Finally, we formulate our conclusions in Sec. IV.
The mathematical analysis of the models we consider is
a generalization of calculations abundantly discussed in
the literature (see [3, 4] for recent reviews). We therefore
won’t go into the details, limiting ourselves to stressing
the main differences with the standard cases.
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II. CANONICAL MINORITY GAME WITH
TWO ASSETS
We consider the case of a market with two assets γ ∈
{−1, 1} and N agents. At each time step t, agents receive
two information patterns µγ ∈ {1, . . . , Pγ}, chosen at
random and independently with uniform probability. It
is assumed that Pγ scales linearly with N , and their ratio
is denoted by αγ = Pγ/N . Every agent i disposes of
two “strategies” aiγ = {aµγiγ } (one for each asset), that
prescribe a binary action a
µγ
iγ ∈ {−1, 1} (buy/sell) for
each possible information pattern. Each component a
µγ
iγ
is assumed to be selected randomly and independently
with uniform probability and is kept fixed throughout
the game. Traders keep tracks of their performance in the
different markets through a score function Uiγ(t) which
is updated with the following rule:
Uiγ(t + 1) = Uiγ(t)− aµγ(t)iγ Aγ(t) (1)
where
Aγ(t) =
1√
N
N∑
j=1
a
µγ (t)
jγ δsj(t),γ (2)
represents the ‘excess demand’ or the total bid on market
γ (the factor 1/
√
N appears here for mathematical con-
venience) and is usually taken as a proxy of (log) returns,
i.e. log pγ(t + 1)− log pγ(t) = λAγ(t). The Ising variable
si(t) = sign [Ui,+1(t)− Ui,−1(t)] (3)
indicates the asset in which player i invests at time t,
which is simply the one with the largest cumulated score.
It is the minus sign on the right-hand side of (1) that
enforces the minority-wins rule in both markets: Agents
will invest in that market where their strategy provides
a larger payoff −aµγ(t)iγ Aγ(t) (or a smaller loss).
It is possible to characterize the asymptotic behaviour
of the multi-agent system (1) with a few macroscopic ob-
servables, such as the predictability H and the volatility
σ2, defined respectively as [13]
H =
∑
γ∈{−1,1}
1
Pγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1
〈Aγ |µγ〉2 = H+ + H− (4)
σ2 =
∑
γ
〈
A2γ
〉
= σ2+ + σ
2
− (5)
with 〈·〉 and 〈·|µγ〉 denoting time averages in the steady
state, the latter conditioned on the occurrence of the in-
formation pattern µγ . Besides these, in the present case,
it is also important to study the relative propensity of
traders to invest in a given market, namely
m =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈si〉 (6)
A positive (resp. negative) m indicates that agents invest
preferentially in asset +1 (resp. −1).
It is clear, already at this stage, that if no a priori
correlation is postulated between the news arrival pro-
cesses on the two assets µ±(t) or between the strategies
adopted by agents in the two markets, no correlation is
created by agents. This result will be quantified below.
However an intuitive argument suffices to clarify the sit-
uation. Indeed
〈A+A−〉 = 1
N
∑
i,j
〈
a
µ+
i,+a
µ−
j,−
1 + si
2
1− sj
2
〉
(7)
and we know [14] that dynamical variables Uiγ(t) evolve
on timescales much longer (of order Pγ) than that over
which µγ changes. Hence we can safely assume that the
distribution of si in Eq. (7) is independent of µ±, which
allows to factor the average 〈aµ+i,+aµ−j,−〉 = 〈aµ+i,+〉〈aµ−j,−〉
over the independent information arrival processes µ±(t).
Given that 〈aµ±i,±〉 ' 0 we conclude that 〈A+A−〉 ' 0
also. Notice that even if the strategies of players were
correlated on the two assets (〈aµ+i,+aµ−i,−〉 6= 0) this would
produce no correlations because the term i = j in Eq. (7)
vanishes. The reason for this is that traders behavior is
aimed at detecting excess returns in the market with no
consideration about the correlation among assets. The
quantities defined above can be obtained both numeri-
cally and analytically (in the limit N →∞) as functions
of α+ and α−. The phase structure of the model is dis-
played in Fig. 1. The (α+, α−) plane is divided in two
regions separated by a critical line. In the ergodic regime,
the system produces exploitable information, i.e. H > 0,
and the dynamics is ergodic, that is the steady state turns
out to be independent of the initialization Uiγ(0) of (1).
Below the critical line, instead, different initial conditions
lead to steady states with different macroscopic prop-
erties (e.g. different volatility). In this region traders
manage to wash out the information and the system is
unpredictable (H = 0). This scenario essentially repro-
duces the standard MG phase transition picture. The
model can be solved analytically in two complementary
ways and in both cases calculations are a straightforward
generalization of those valid for the single-asset case. The
static approach relies on the fact that the stationary state
is described by the minima of the random function
H =
∑
γ∈{−1,1}
1
NPγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1

 N∑
j=1
a
µγ
jγ
1 + γmj
2


2
(8)
over the variables −1 ≤ mi = 〈si〉 ≤ 1. H coincides
with the predictability in the steady state, which implies
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FIG. 1: Analytical phase diagram of the canonical two-asset
Minority Game in the (α+, α−) plane.
that speculators make the market as unpredictable as
possible. The statistical mechanics approach proceeds
by studying the properties of a system of soft spins mi
with Hamiltonian H at a fictitious inverse temperature
β in the limit N → ∞. The relevant order parameter
is the overlap Qab = (1/N)
∑
i miamib between different
minima a and b, which takes the replica-symmetric form
Qab = q + (Q − q)δab. Phases where the minimum is
unique, corresponding to H > 0, are described by taking
Q → q and χ = β(Q − q) finite in the limit β → ∞.
The condition χ →∞ signals the phase transition to the
unpredictable phase with H = 0.
The dynamical approach employs path-integrals to
transform the N coupled single-agent processes for the
variable yi(t) = Ui,+1(t)− Ui,−1(t) into a single stochas-
tic process equivalent to the original N -agent system in
the limit N → ∞ [4]. The calculation is greatly simpli-
fied if one studies the ‘batch’ version [15], which roughly
corresponds to a time re-scaling t → τ = t/N and, apart
from the value of σ2, has the same collective behavior.
In this case, the effective process has the form
y(τ +1) = y(τ)−
∑
γ,τ ′
[
1 +
G
2αγ
]−1
(τ, τ ′)
γ + s(τ ′)
2
+z(τ)
(9)
where z(τ) is a zero-average Gaussian noise z(τ) with
correlation matrix 〈z(τ)z(τ ′)〉 = Λ(τ, τ ′) with
Λ =
∑
γ
[(
1 +
G
2αγ
)−1 (
1
αγ
Dγ
) (
1 +
GT
2αγ
)−1]
(10)
where
Dγ(τ, τ
′) =
1
4
[1 + γm(τ) + γm(τ ′) + C(τ, τ ′)] (11)
m(τ) = 〈s(τ)〉 C(τ, τ ′) = 〈s(τ)s(τ ′)〉 (12)
while G(τ, τ ′) =
〈
∂s(τ)
∂h(τ ′)
〉
denotes the response to an
infinitesimal probing field h(τ). Both H and σ2 can
be obtained from the asymptotic study of Λ(τ, τ). Er-
godic steady states, where C(τ, τ ′) = c(τ − τ ′) and
G(τ, τ ′) = g(τ − τ ′), can be described in terms of
three variables only, namely the “magnetization” m =
limτ→∞
1
τ
∑τ
τ ′=1 m(τ
′), the persistent autocorrelation
q = limτ→∞
1
τ
∑τ
τ ′=1 c(τ
′) and the susceptibility χ =
limτ→∞
∑τ
τ ′=1 G(τ
′), for which one derives closed equa-
tions that can be solved numerically. The results for
m, q and χ coincide with those obtained in the static
approach, thus providing a dynamic interpretation for
these quantities. It turns out that χ diverges as the line
in Fig. 1 is approached from above, signalling ergodicity
breaking and the onset of a phase in which the steady
state depends on the initial conditions of the dynamics.
We find
H =
∑
γ
α2γ(1 + 2γm + q)
2
[2αγ + χ]2
(13)
which implies H = 0 in the non-ergodic phase. For the
volatility (of the original on-line case), one obtains in-
stead the approximate expression
σ2 = H +
1− q
2
(14)
which is very accurate in the ergodic phase. The be-
haviour of these quantities along a cut α+ + α− = con-
stant in the ergodic phase is reported in Fig. 2 together
with that of the order parameter m. The dynamical
approach also allows to prove explicitly the vanishing
of the correlation function 〈Aγ(t)Aγ′(t′)〉 for γ 6= γ′.
Defining A
µγ
γ (t) = N−1/2
∑
i a
µγ
iγ δsi(t),γ , one finds, in
particular[16],〈
Aµγγ (t)A
νγ′
γ′ (t
′)
〉
= δγ,γ′
√
αγαγ′δµγ ,νγ′Λ(t, t
′) (15)
A na¨ıve argument would suggest that agents are at-
tracted by information rich markets. Instead one sees
that, in a range of parameters, agents play preferentially
in the market with smaller information complexity αγ
and with the smallest information content Hγ . For all
those traders with |mi| < 1, the conditions for the mini-
mum of H give
mi = −
〈
a
µ+
i+ A
(−i)
+
〉
+
〈
a
µ−
i− A
(−i)
−
〉
(16)
where A
(−i)
γ stands for the contribution to Aγ of all
traders except i. Hence mi equals the difference in the
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FIG. 2: Behavior of m (top), H (middle) and σ2 (bottom)
versus α+ − α− for α+ + α− = 0.5. Markers correspond to
simulations with N = 256 agents, averaged over 200 runs with
different strategy realizations per point. Lines are analytical
results (see Appendices A and B for details). In the middle
panel, the dashed line corresponds to H+ and the dot-dashed
line corresponds to H
−
.
payoffs of agent i against all other traders and this rela-
tion means that if mi > 0 then agent i invests preferen-
tially in asset + because that is more convenient. There-
fore, Fig. 2 implies that the relation between payoffs
and information is less obvious than the na¨ıve argument
above suggests.
This somewhat paradoxical result is due to the fact
that agents are constrained to trade in one of the two
markets. Rather than seeking the most profitable asset,
agents escape the asset where their loss is largest.
III. GRAND CANONICAL MINORITY GAME
WITH TWO ASSETS
In the grand-canonical framework players have the op-
tion not to play if their expected payoff doesn’t beat a
pre-determined benchmark (which represents for instance
a fixed interest rate or an incentive to enter the market)
[7]. As in the previous case, we consider two assets or
markets, tagged by γ ∈ {−1, 1} as before. Each trader
disposes of one quenched random strategy aiγ = {aµγiγ }
per asset, which prescribes an action a
µγ
iγ ∈ {−1, 1}
for each possible information pattern µγ ∈ {1, . . . , Pγ}.
Again µγ(t) are chosen at random independently for all t
and γ ∈ {−1, 1}. As in the one-asset grand-canonical
MG, it is necessary to introduce a certain number of
traders – so-called producers – who invest at every time
step no matter what with a fixed strategy b
µγ
iγ ∈ {−1, 1}.
The number of producers in market γ shall be denoted
by Nγp and their aggregate contribution to the excess
demand Aγ(t) by B
µγ (t)
γ =
∑Nγp
i=1 b
µγ(t)
iγ . Therefore Equa-
tions (1) and (2) become in this case
Uiγ(t + 1) = Uiγ(t)− aµγ(t)iγ Aγ(t)−  (17)
Aγ(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µγ(t)
jγ φiγ(t) + B
µγ (t)
γ (18)
where φiγ(t) = δsi(t),γθ[Uiγ(t)] ∈ {0, 1} and si(t) is given
by (3) (note that the normalizing factor
√
N is absent
in this case). The parameter  represents the benchmark
to beat in order to invest, so that traders will invest in
asset γ only if its score exceeds that of the benchmark,
i.e., asymptotically, only if the corresponding score Uiγ(t)
grows at least as t. Notice that agents are allowed to
invest in at most one asset at a time. If agents were
allowed to invest in both assets simultaneously then it
is easy to see that the model becomes equivalent to two
un-coupled GCMGs.
Also in this case, no significant correlation be-
tween assets is introduced by the behavior of spec-
ulators. Again, the collective properties of the sta-
tionary state can be characterized by the predictabil-
ity H =
∑
γ(PγN)
−1
∑
µγ
〈Aγ |µγ〉2, the volatility
σ2 =
∑
γ N
−1
〈
A2γ
〉
, and the “magnetization” m =
N−1
∑
i(〈φi+〉 − 〈φi−〉), which is the analog of Eq. (6).
These quantities can be studied as before upon varying
the parameters αγ = Pγ/N and . We also introduce
the relative number of producers np = N
γ
p /Pγ , which for
simplicity is assumed to be the same for both assets. No-
tice that for np = 0 and  → −∞ we recover the model
of the previous section where there are no producers and
speculators are forced to trade.
We focus first on m (see Fig. 3). One sees that when
traders have positive incentives to trade ( < 0) the mar-
ket behaves as in the previous section, with speculators
investing preferentially in the asset with less information.
This tendency becomes less pronounced the larger is np,
which is reasonable in view of our discussion above, be-
cause then the game becomes more and more profitable
for speculators.
This scenario is qualitatively reproduced at all  < 0
and it changes drastically as soon as  > 0. In this case,
traders concentrate most of their investments into the
information-rich asset even if np is very low. The fact
that traders can refrain from investing implies that trad-
ing is dominated by gain seeking rather than escaping
losses.
The theory for this case is slightly more involved than
for the canonical model. On the static side, the Hamil-
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FIG. 3: Behavior of m versus α+s − α
−
s for α
+
s + α
−
s = 1 and
flat initial conditions. Markers correspond to simulations with
Ns = 200 speculators, averaged over 200 runs with different
strategy realizations per point. Lines are analytical results
(interrupted when the non-ergodic phase is met, see phase
diagram). Other parameters are as follows:  = 0.1, np = 1
();  = 0.1, np = 0.1 (4);  = −0.1, np = 1 (©);  = −0.1,
np = 0.1 ().
tonian is now
H =
∑
γ∈{−1,1}
1
NPγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1

 N∑
j=1
a
µγ
jγ pijγ + B
µγ
γ


2
+
2
N
N∑
j=1
pij0
(19)
where piiγ = 〈φiγ〉 ∈ [0, 1] denotes the frequency with
which agent i invests in asset γ in the steady state,
while pii0 = 1 −
∑
γ piiγ . Notice that H0 = H is the
predictability. As before, it is necessary to introduce
a fictitious temperature β > 0 and turn to the replica
trick to analyze the minima of H over {piγi } consid-
ering the limit β → ∞. The main difference with
the canonical model lies in the fact that one must now
consider an overlap order parameter per asset, namely
Qγab = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 pi
a
iγpi
b
iγ (a, b = 1, . . . , r, γ ∈ {−1, 1})
and, in the replica-symmetric Ansatz, one ‘susceptibility’
per asset, that is χγ = β(Qγ − qγ).
Again these quantities can be given a dynamic inter-
pretation with the generating function approach [4]. This
approach leads, in the batch approximation, to two effec-
tive processes (one per asset), namely
Uγ(τ + 1) = Uγ(τ)−  + zγ(τ)
√
1 + αγnp
− (1 + αγnp)
∑
τ ′
[1 + λγGγ ]
−1
(τ, τ ′)φγ(τ
′) (20)
where λγ =
1+αγnp
αγ
and the noise correlations are de-
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram of the  = 0, np = 1 grand-canonical
two-asset Minority Game in the (α+s , α
−
s ) plane. The continu-
ous line is analytical, the other phase boundaries are obtained
from numerical simulations (averages over 100 runs with dif-
ferent strategy realizations per point).
scribed by the matrices Λγ(τ, τ
′) = 〈zγ(τ)zγ(τ ′)〉 with
Λγ =
[
(1 + λγGγ)
−1
(λγCγ)
(
1 + λγG
T
γ
)−1]
(21)
Cγ(τ, τ
′) = 〈φγ(τ)φγ (τ ′)〉 Gγ(τ, τ ′) =
〈
∂φγ(τ)
∂hγ(τ ′)
〉
(22)
In order to characterize time-translation invariant and
ergodic steady states four quantities are now re-
quired, namely two persistent autocorrelations qγ =
limτ,τ0→∞
1
τ
∑τ
τ ′=1 Cγ(τ0, τ0 + τ
′) and two susceptibili-
ties χγ = limτ,τ0→∞
∑τ
τ ′=1 Gγ(τ0, τ0 + τ
′), γ ∈ {−1, 1}.
It is still possible (though slightly more laborious) to ob-
tain their values numerically and the quantity m can be
also calculated in terms of the qγ ’s and the χγ ’s. Now
ergodicity breaking is connected to the divergence of at
least one of the susceptibilities.
The behavior of the model is considerably richer than
in the previous case. For  6= 0 we find that H has a
unique non-degenerate minimum and both χγ ’s are fi-
nite. The case  = 0 is peculiar as it marks the boundary
between two different behaviors  < 0 and  > 0. For
 = 0 and α± large enough, both markets are predictable
(H0 > 0) and the susceptibility is finite. However, one
of the susceptibilities diverges while the other stays fi-
nite for lower values of α±. This signals the onset of a
phase where one of the markets is unpredictable while
still H0 > 0, a situation with particularly striking dy-
namical consequences. As a result, the phase structure
of this model is rather complex (see Fig. 4). The phase
boundary separating the region with H = 0 from that
with H > 0 has been calculated assuming that both sus-
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FIG. 5: Behavior of m versus α+s − α
−
s for α
+
s + α
−
s = 0.4,
 = 0, np = 1 and biased initial conditions (∆U = Ui+(0) −
Ui−(0)). Markers correspond to simulations with N = 200
speculators, averaged over 200 runs with different strategy
realizations per point.
ceptibilities diverge keeping a finite ratio χ+/χ−. Nev-
ertheless we have been unable to obtain analytical lines
for the complete phase structure at  = 0. The phase
boundary of the non-ergodic region (which would corre-
spond to the divergence of just one of the susceptibilities)
has been instead estimated from numerical simulations
and the corresponding lines must be considered a crude
approximation.
The phase diagram in Fig. 4 reveals the region of the
phase space in which stylized facts are recovered. In fact
in the two-assets Gran Canonical Minority Game we find
the same phenomenology encountered in the single-asset
Gran Canonical Minority Game: fat tails of the return
distribution and volatility clustering appear for finite size
systems close enough to the non ergodic phase [7].
Moreover in this critical region the system is highly
susceptible respect to changes in the payoff functions.
This is reflected at  = 0 in the dependence of traders
behavior respect to initial conditions. Fig. 5 shows the
magnetization as a function of α+ − α− along the cut
α+ +α− = 0.4 in the phase diagram. This line is entirely
contained in the non-ergodic phase. While the market
remains globally predictable (H > 0) the fact that one
of the markets becomes unpredictable (e.g. H+ = 0)
implies that the steady state depends on initial condi-
tions. It is finally worth mentioning that the non-ergodic
regimes with one unpredictable market extend to large
values of αγ .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a multi-asset version of the Minority
Game in order to address the problem of how adaptive
heterogeneous agents would diversify their investments
when the different assets bear different levels of informa-
tion. While the phase structure of the models is substan-
tially a generalization of that of single-asset games, we
have found, in the grand-canonical model, a remarkable
dependence of the probability to invest in a certain asset
on the agent’s incentives to trade (). Specifically, agents
who have no incentives to trade other than the gains
derived from it, invest preferentially in information-rich
assets. On the contrary, when there are positive incen-
tives to trade ( < 0) agents invest more likely in the
information-poor asset. This same behaviour is found in
the canonical model, where agents must choose one asset
at each time step and cannot refrain from entering the
market.
The generalization of our results to a larger number
of assets or to a wider strategy pool for the agents is
straightforward. The results discussed here are indicative
of the generic qualitative behavior we expect.
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